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Introduction
City size distributions are remarkably stable over time. The relative size differences between large and small cities have often found to be fairly constant and to change only very slowly. The general conclusion in the literature is that it is still not very well understood why city sizes vary in a systematic way. Basically, three types of explanations have come to the fore. First, models based on economic forces. In these models externalities or increasing returns to scale determine city growth. Second, models which assume city growth to be completely scale-invariant and random. As a result the current size of a city does not matter for its growth prospects. Third, models based on physical geographical characteristics of certain locations in which, for example, a city near a navigable waterway will be larger than a land-locked city (see for a survey of various theories Brakman, Garretsen, and Van Marrewijk (2001)).
In an attempt to discriminate between the various theoretical explanations Davis and Weinstein (2001) use the case of Japanese agglomerations. They not only analyze the variation and persistence of the Japanese regional population density over the course of 8000 years (!) but, more importantly for our present purposes, they also investigate whether or not a large temporary shock (in casu, the bombing of Japanese cities during WWII) had a permanent or only a temporary effect on Japanese city growth and the city-size distribution in the post-WWII period. This is a first step to distinguish between the three a fore mentioned theoretical approaches. On the one hand the fundamental or physical geography approach predicts that a large random shock will only have temporary effects while at the other extreme the random growth approach predicts that there will be permanent effects on city-growth. Davis and Weinstein (2001) conclude that the evidence is most favorable for the fundamental geography approach. With respect to the "bombing" shock, it turns out that this shock had at most a temporary impact on the relatively city growth in Japan. Japanese cities quickly recovered from the WWII experience and quite soon after WWII they were back on their pre-war growth path.
In the present paper we build upon the analysis of Davis and Weinstein (2001) on the impact of allied bombing on Japanese cities during WWII. We do so by taking the strategic bombing of German cities during WWII as another example of a large, temporary shock. In doing so we also take the split of Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949 into account. In this respect the German case is quite unique. The different policy reaction by the two governments to the same shock might be relevant for post-war city growth in both countries. The primary goal of this paper is to analyze whether or not the destruction of German cities during WWII had an impact on German city growth after WW II.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide some background information on the scope of the allied area bombing of Germany during WWII. We also give some (qualitative) information on post-WWII policies with respect to the (re-) building of German cities. Section 3 presents our data set and gives information on the German city-size distribution for the period . For this period we have data on 103 German cities (81 West German and 22 East German cities), and the city-specific information in section 3.1 not only includes the city-size but also the degree of war damage. The information in section 3.2 on the variation and persistence of relative city-sizes is based on well-known proxies like the rank correlation of citysizes and the slope of rank-size curve. In section 4 we perform growth regressions to test the impact of the "bombing" shock on post-WWII city growth. We present estimations for the FRG, GDR as well as for Germany as a whole. Section 5 evaluates our findings and section 6 concludes.
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The Strategic Bombing of German Cities during WWII 2
Allied Bombing and the Degree of Destruction
In the Second World War (WWII), allied forces heavily bombed Germany. During the first period from 1940 to early 1942 the targets selected by the English RAF were mostly industrial targets, such as, oil, aluminum, and aero-engine plants, and transportation systems. Marshaling yards were to be treated as secondary targets, but the heavy bombardments on these yards showed that the primary targets were initially difficult to find. In general, it turned out that the bombing of a complete economy was not easy: prior to 1943, air raids probably had little effect on the German production capacity. It was estimated, for example, that a big raid on Kiel, prior to the summer of 1943, aimed at attacking submarine production facilities only delayed production three weeks. The USA (1945) survey finds no clear-cut indication that before 1943 the production of German economy was smaller than it would have been without the air raids.
From the summer of 1943 onwards, the bombing campaign became more effective.
Raids on the Ruhrgebiet, for example, resulted in an 8% loss in steel production, but due to large stocks the effect on armament production was only limited. The attacks also had clear effects on the production of ball bearings and crankshafts, which were important for the German war economy, but also here large stocks made that the raids had only a relatively small effect on German armament production. It was estimated that air raids reduced production only by 5% by the end of 1943.
From the middle of 1944, the effects of the air raids on the German economy became more destructive for the German war economy. This was caused by the fact that it became possible for the first time to carry out repeated attacks deep into Germany.
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During 1944, the results of the air raids quickly became catastrophical for the German economy: the production of ball bearings fell to 66% of the pre-raid average, aviation 2 To a large extent the information in section 2.1 is based on the following sources: (i) USA (1945 : the emphasis in this new program was on area bombing, in which the centers of towns would be the main target for nocturnal raids.
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The introduction of the fourengined Lancaster plane, an improved radar system for navigation, and a better organization of bomber crews made the new tactic possible. The Germans themselves had also used the tactic of bombing city centers before 1942: Rotterdam in The
Netherlands and Coventry in the UK stand out as examples. The central idea of this method was that the destruction of cities would have an enormous and destructive effect on the morale of the people living in it. Moreover, the destruction of city centers implied the destruction of a large part of a city's housing stock. This led to the dislocation of workers, which would disrupt industrial production even if the factories themselves were not hit.
Arthur Harris and his staff had a strong faith in the morale effects of bombing and thought that Germany's will to fight would be weakened by the destruction of German cities. Furthermore, Harris, as a WW I veteran, thought this line of attack could help to prevent the slaughter of ground forces that he had witnessed in the trenches of WW I. This strategy implied that targeted cities were not necessarily large, industrialized cities. On the contrary, relatively small cities with for instance distinguished historic (and thus highly inflammable!) town centers were also preferred targets under this plan.
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Targets were also selected more or less at random, depending for example on weather conditions. The first German city to fall victim to this new strategy was Lübeck, in the night of March, [28] [29] 1942 . Although the destruction of the city center was enormous, the effect on production was only limited: within a week the production was back at 90% of normal production levels. by the end of the war 45 of the 60 largest German cities were ruined. The extent of the destruction is illustrated by Figure 1 which gives for all major German cites the share of dwellings (Wohnraum) that was destroyed by the end of the war. On average 40% of the dwellings in the larger cities was destroyed (which is roughly comparable with the corresponding figures in Davis and Weinstein (2001) for Japan). 6 Harris described the strategy as follows "But it must be emphasized (…) that in no instance, except in Essen, were we aiming specifically at any one factory (…) the destruction of factories, which was nevertheless on an enormous scale, could be regarded as a bonus. The aiming points were usually right in the centre of the town (…) it was this densely built-up center which was most susceptible to area attack with incendiary bombs (Harris, 1947) Figure 1 Share of dwellings destroyed in major German cities by 1945.
Source: Knopp (2001) . The shaded sections indicate the share of dwellings that was destroyed in the respective cities in 1945. The size of the Ο circle represents the city-size: a small, medium or large Ο sign indicates that this city had respectively a population of <100.000, 100.000-500.000, or >500.000 people.
Two other city-specific indicators of the war shock, the amount of rubble in m and 1946 also confirm the substantial degree of destruction (see also the next section).
Hardly any city in Germany was not attacked, and an estimated 410.000 people lost their lives due to air raids, and seven million people lost their homes. To sum up, German cities were on average severely hit by the war and this was in particular (but not exclusively) due to the allied bombing campaign and there is a considerable degree of variation in the degree of destruction across cities (see Figure   1 ). The destruction of German cities during WWII can be looked upon as a prime example of a large, temporary shock that can be used to test the (stability of) relative city-size growth in Germany. But it was not only the destruction of cities that had an impact on city-sizes. The collapse of Germany in 1945 led to an enormous flow of refugees in the aftermath of WWII. The inflow of millions of German refugees (Vertriebene) from former German territories and East European countries more than compensated for the loss of lives in Germany itself. 9 We consider this inflow of refugees also as part of the WWII shock.
Rebuilding efforts and the distinction between the FRG and the GDR
Before we turn to our data set, model specification and estimation results we must also briefly discuss the post-war reconstruction and building efforts because they obviously are potentially relevant for post-war city-growth. The distinction between the FRG and GDR policies is not only important because the market economy of the FRG and the planned economy of the GDR were based on very different economic principles, but also because when it comes to (re-) building efforts the two countries pursued very different policies. The FRG built far more new houses than the GDR (3.1 million between 1950 and 1961 compared to 0.5 million houses in the GDR), and its government (both at the federal and state level) also had the declared objective to rebuild the west German Großstädte to their pre-war levels. As Figure 3 already indicates, in the mid-1950s a number of these cities were back at the 1939 city-size levels. In the GDR on the other hand the (re-) building efforts were explicitly not focused on the rebuilding of the (inner) cities hit by WWII (East Berlin was an exception) but far more on the creation of new industrial agglomerations like Eisenhüttenstadt or Neu-Hoyerswerda to which industries and workers were "stimulated" to move. To this date, one can still see the traces of WWII destruction in many former GDR cities in Germany. The formal division of Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) took place in 1949 and in this respect post-war city growth across Germany as a whole (GDR and FRG) is not only influenced by the war destruction shock but by the political split of 1949 as well. In section 4 we will deal with the question whether it is possible to disentangle these two shocks.
The distinction between the FRG and GDR is also important when it comes to actual government funds allocated to the (re-)construction efforts. We have no data for eastern German cities, but given the difference in policy objectives as outlined above, it seems safe to assume that the GDR only spent a very small fraction of what the FRG government did in this respect. In his in-depth study of the reconstruction of the West German cities after WWII, Diefendorf (1993) explains how the federal housing law of 1950 in the FRG has been crucial to in allocating funds to the (re-) construction of houses. In 1953, for instance, the federal government budgeted 400 million-DM for housing construction, 75% of which was allotted to the Bundesländer and each Bundesland subsequently divided these funds to its cities. At the federal and the state level roughly the same distribution formula was used (Diefendorf, 1993 , pp. 134-135): 50% was based on population size, 25% on the degree of destruction, and 25% on the level of actual industrialization. Note thus that in FRG city-size and the degree of destruction partly determined how much funds a city actually got, this is obviously something to take into account in the analysis of the impact of the "bombing" shock on post-war city growth. Finally, even though we will focus in our estimations on the impact of this shock in the FRG-GDR period, we will also briefly look at city-size data for the period 1990-1999 in section 3, that is to say for the period after the reunification of 1990. It is interesting to see how after 3 large shocks (WWII; the creation of the FRG and GDR in 1949; reunification in 1990) the city-size distribution has evolved. 9 Rough estimates indicate that almost 11 million refugees had to find a new home in Germany (both in
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Data Set and the German City-Size Distribution
Data set
Our sample consists of cities in the territory of present-day Germany that had a population of more than 50.000 people in 1939 or that were in any point of time in the post-WWII period a so called Großstadt, a city with more than 100.000 inhabitants (103 cities in total). These 103 cities consist of 81 West German and 22 East German cities.
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To analyze post WWII-city growth, we need cross-section data about the WWII-shock and time series data on city population. Kästner (1949) Besatzungszonen und Groß-Berlin.
As we will run regressions on the relative size of cities before and after the WWII (city size relative to the total population), we also need statistics on the national population. This is not as straightforward as it might seem, because the German For the German case it is in our view not useful to include the number of casualties per city as a variable measuring the degree of destruction, because this number includes prisoners of war, foreigners, and refugees and is therefore not a good indicator of the destruction of a city. The housing stock is our preferred indicator of the population of a city also because it has been found that the link between the East and West Germany). 10 The east German city Görlitz fulfilled the 1939-criterion, but was excluded because part of the city became the Polish Zgorzelec after WW II .
housing stock and the population is tight (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2001 , p. 6). Figure 2 above already suggests that the change in the housing stock and the change in 
The German city-size distribution 1925-1999
Before we turn to our growth regressions in section 4, we first provide some summary statistics on the development of the German city-size distribution during the period 1925-1999. To start with, the rank-size distribution gives an efficient summary of city sizes and city size distributions.
A rank size distribution can be described by equation (1):
Where c is a constant, M j is the size of city j (measured by its population) and R j is the rank of city j (rank 1 for the largest city, rank 2 for the second largest city, etc.). In empirical research q is the estimated coefficient, giving the slope of the supposedly log-linear relationship between city size and city rank. Zipf's law is a special case: it is said that Zipf's Law only holds if q = 1. If q = 1, the largest city is precisely k times as large as the k th largest city.
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If q is smaller than 1, a more even distribution of city sizes results than predicted by Zipf's Law (if q = 0 all cities are of the same size). If q is larger than 1, the large cities are larger than Zipf's Law predicts, implying more urban agglomeration, that is the largest city is more than k times as large as the k th largest city. There is, however, a priori no reason to assume specific values for q. Its By calculating the value of q for all years in our sample, we can trace the evolution of the rank-size distribution in Germany. We have calculated the q-coefficient for Germany as a whole (not shown here) and, as displayed by Figure 4 , for East and West Germany separately. A number of observations come to the fore as Figure 4 illustrates. First, before the war the (absolute) value of q was, certainly for West Germany, relatively close to 1. WWII drastically changed the city size distribution in the sense that city sizes became more equal (the absolute value of q drops between 1939 and 1946). Second, although the war changed the city size distribution, Figure 4 also shows that the trend towards smaller (absolute) values for q persisted after the war, for both West and East Germany there is no return to the pre-war rank-size distribution. This change in q towards a more even city-size distribution in the postwar period is not uncommon to the extent that it can be observed in other developed countries that experienced a shift from an industrial economy towards a more service oriented economy. This process is generally found to be associated with smaller Table 2 confirms this notion. In Table 2 rank correlations for the largest cities are given and they indeed show a clear persistence in the rank of individual cities; with the rank correlation increasing until the mid-1960s
and decreasing somewhat afterwards. The summary statistics for Germany presented in this sub-section basically confirm the idea of (some degree of) stability of the city-size distribution over time. In this respect and despite WWII and other large shocks that hit Germany and its cities in the 20 th century, Germany seems not very different from other developed countries.
These summary statistics are, however, not able to answer our central question whether or not WWII and the ensuing split of Germany in 1949 had an impact on German city-growth. It is to this question that we now turn.
The WWII Shock and its Impact on City Growth in Germany
As a formal test of the WWII shock on German city growth, we follow the methodology employed by Davis and Weinstein (2001) . Their approach is basically to test if the growth of city size (with city size as a share of total population) follows a random walk. The relative city size s for each city i at time t can be represented by (in logs):
where Ω i is the initial size of city i and ε it represents city-specific shocks.
The persistence of a shock can be modeled as: than the shock will dissipate over time. With ρ=0 the shock has no persistence at all, and for 0<ρ<1 there is some degree of persistence but ultimately the relative city size is stationary an hence any shock will dissipate over time. As Davis 14 So α=0 corresponds with the case of a random walk. If we find that -1 ≤ α < 0 this is evidence that a random walk must be rejected and hence that the war shock had no effect at all (α=-1) or at most a temporary effect (-1<α<0) on relative city-growth in Germany. Equation (5) in fact tests a random walk with drift; the 'drift' is captured by β 0 and describes possible long-run trends towards more or less urbanisation due to for instance changes in the industrial structure that might influence city growth. 12 We did perform the Dickey-Fuller test for our sample of west German cities. For the majority of west German cities we can reject the hypothesis that city growth follows a random walk. 13 Note that we can include a constant because the summation over all s is not equal to 1 (the share of a city is relative to the total population, and not to the sum of city sizes in our sample). 14 Note that the measure of the shock (or innovation) is the growth rate between 1939 and 1946, which (see equation (2) and (3)) is correlated with the error term in the estimating equation. This indicates that we have to use instruments. Furthermore, and as has been explained in section 2, because of the very different post-war history of western and eastern Germany we mainly estimate equation (5) separately for both Germanies. As we have already explained in section 3, the number of war casualties for each city is not a good instrument for the German case in our view. In order to test for the power of our three potential instruments we ran regressions in which the variable 1946 -s i, 1939 is to be explained by our instruments. It turns out that the instruments are highly significant with the right sign. In Table 3 we do, however, only show the IV-results with the housing stock as instrument. The reason to do this is twofold.
First, we only have data on the rubble and the land tax variable for (a sub-set of) westGerman cities and using these instruments would thus render a comparison between the results for West and East Germany difficult. Second, the results for West
Germany do not depend on our choice of the instruments. In all cases we find results that are qualitatively the same as those for IV-estimation with only the housing stock destruction as instrument.
Furthermore, as an additional check on the validity of equation (5) , where x i,t ,(x j,t ) is the difference between the estimated share, s i ,(s j ) of a city i (j) and the actual share of city i (j) (in fact we are looking at residuals with zero mean), and w i,j a normalized spatial weight between i, and j. we choose The value of the corrrelation coefficient I thus gives a high weight to a similar misspecification of two cities if they are close to each other. In this way the statistic reveals possible spatial clusters of mis-specification. 15 We take the IV-estimates of Anselin, 1988) .
From Table 3 A second observation is that the OLS and IV regressions lead to similar conclusions but that one should focus on the IV-results for reasons explained above. Thirdly, in theory the strategic bombing campaign of the allied forces might have (systematically) targeted the rapidly growing cities, which could bias our results.
Although the selection of targets was more or less random (see section 2), we controlled for this by adding a pre-war growth trend (relative size growth between 1933-1939).
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The results are almost identical confirming that the selection of targets was random. A fourth observation is that, as expected, the dissipation of the initial shock in western Germany is larger in the long-run than in the short-run, as the difference between the estimates for t=4 and t=17 illustrate.
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For eastern Germany this difference is not relevant as city growth follows a random walk.
The last row of Table 3 shows the estimation results after we pooled the west and east
German cities (for t=4). Given the greater number of west German cities in our sample (79 versus 21) it is not surprising that the results are rather close to those for the sub-sample of west German cities. One might argue that our estimation results are to some extent the combination of 2 shocks, the WWII shock and the division of The difference in city growth between eastern and western Germany is remarkable.
An obvious candidate to explain this difference is the difference in government policy 16 As to the randomness of the selection of targets, inspection of our data shows that for cities with a population of at least 50.000 people there is indeed a large variation in the war shock (s i,1946 -s i, 1939 ) across cities, 17 Note that this finding is not inconsistent with the persistence of the ranking of individual cities as shown in section 3 (recall Table 2 ): if for s i,t >s j,t than a sufficient condition for s i, t+1 >s j, t+1 is that ρ=0 (and hence α= -1). In this case a shock cannot disturb the ranking of the city-size (in levels). For 0<ρ≤1, which applies to west as well as east Germany according to table 3, the ranking of cities at t+1 can (but need not) to be different from the ranking at t. To see this, suppose that two cities A and B have a size at time t of respectively 100.000 and 10.000 and suppose also that the growth process is characterized by a random walk (like in the case of east Germany) and after a shock has occurred cities A and B have at time t+1 a respective size of 40.000 and 7.000. In terms of (negative) growth city A is worse off than city B but the ranking has not changed.
between the two Germanies (see section 2). Government support on the city level is not available. For the GDR cities this is probably not a problem because, as we explained in section 2.2, government policies were not directed at the re-building of cities. However, for West German cities we can infer the following about government support (Diefendorf, 1993) . Compared to Table 3 , the addition of the government support variable slightly seems to increase the speed at which the war shock dissipates for West German city growth (the α coefficient is somewhat larger, and hence the implied ρ is somewhat closer to zero). The main conclusion remains, however, unaltered. In 1950 or 1963 westGerman cities had only partially recovered from the WWII shock but ultimately the impact of the war shock is destined to be temporary.
Surprisingly, higher government support is associated with lower growth. It therefore seems that government support hindered the adjustment process to the extent that the policy objective (see section 2.2) of a return to the pre-war relative city-sizes was not stimulated by the actual support that took place. Two reasons why this might be the case come to the fore. First, the support variable was not necessarily intended to grant relatively more funds to the cities that were relatively more destroyed during the war. 1946 -s i,1939 ) with each city's share of total rubble, there is no relationship whatsoever whereas there is a clear negative relationship when we take the variable rubble per capita instead.
Evaluation
In section 3.2 we have provided some evidence that despite some large "shocks" the German city-size distribution is relative stable over time. In the introduction we mentioned that various theoretical approaches (random growth, fundamental geography, increasing returns) can be called upon to explain this stability. The growth regressions in section 4 basically tested whether German city-growth follows a random walk using WWII as a large, temporary shock. Following Davis and
Weinstein (2001) such a test enables us to make a first crude distinction between the three basic theoretical approaches. In this section we will briefly evaluate our findings against the background of these theories. Before we do so, it must be emphasized that we certainly do not want to claim that the analysis in this paper suffices for a conclusive test of these theories. Nevertheless, there are some interesting implications.
First, there are theories that emphasize fundamental geography or non-neutral space to explain (differences in) city-growth and the resulting city size distribution. The basic idea is that specific features in the landscape that favor certain cities. However, geographers typically stress the importance of fundamental geography. Gallup et al. Second, there are theories that stress increasing returns and externalities that arise when economic activity agglomerates in certain locations. Firms group together in a city because local demand is high and demand is high because firms have decided to produce in that city. This provides a rationale for agglomeration like in the core new economic geography model by Krugman (1991) . In addition, this approach shows how additional externalities that are associated with specialization of cities on the one hand and/or the diversification of economic activity within the city on the other hand can lead to cities of different sizes and to differences in city-growth. The difference with the first approach is that the locational (dis)advantages of cities are man-made and not given by nature. The specialization/diversification distinction is referred to in the literature as one between so-called Jacobs externalities and Marshall-ArrowRomer (MAR) externalities. Both externalities refer to knowledge spillovers between firms. With MAR externalities, knowledge spillovers occur between firms that belong to the same industry. With Jacobs-externalities, knowledge spillovers are not industryspecific but take place among firms of different industries. Glaeser et al. (1992) conclude that Jacobs-externalities are the most important externalities for employment growth in U.S. cities. There is, however, also evidence in favor of MAR-externalities. Black and Henderson (1999) and also Beardsell and Henderson (1999) for instance find for the USA that MAR-externalities are to be found in the high-tech industries.
Again, the point to emphasize here is that in the increasing returns approach the interaction between economic agents and not the actual geography that shapes the urban landscape. In this approach the actual space is typically assumed to be neutral.
Finally, there the approach that shows that under certain conditions a random growth process of cities can lead to stable city-size distributions. Simon shows that the random growth of the population will eventually result in Zipf's Law (Simon, 1955 ).
Gabaix (1999) calls upon Gibrat's Law and proves that if every city, large or small, shares the same common mean growth rate, and if the variance of this growth rate is the same for every city, Zipf's Law follows. As opposed to the first two approaches, this approach focuses on the statistical properties of the city-growth process and does not go into the economics of city-growth nor does it pay attention to physical geographical differences between locations.
The prediction of these theories on the evolution of city growth following a large temporary shock, like our German WWII shock, is different. The most ambivalent theory is the theory based on increasing returns and externalities. Positive or negative externalities re-enforce each other once they come into existence; large cities will become larger and small cities will become smaller. This however does not imply that destructed but initially large cities will necessary return to their old size (or rank). It depends on whether or not the initial situation was an equilibrium in the first place, and if so, whether or not that equilibrium was stable or not. If the initial equilibrium was stable this might be consistent with the persistence of city size distributions and a temporary shock eventually dissipates. If the initial equilibrium was unstable the evolution of city sizes might appear as a random walk.
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Theories based on fundamental geography lead, however, to a clear-cut prediction: after a temporary shock the original city size distribution will re-emerge and the effects of a temporary shock on city-growth will dissipate over time. Finally, random growth theories predict, of course, that the evolution of city sizes follows a random walk and a large, temporary shock like the WWII shock will have permanent effects. Do our findings in section 4 make it possible to choose between these theories? To some (limited) degree we think the answer is affirmative. For western Germany the random walk hypothesis is clearly rejected which is bad news for the random growth approach. In this respect our findings for western Germany are similar to those found by Davis and Weinstein (2001) for Japan even though we find that the war shock dissipates more slowly over time than in the case of Japan. The fundamental geography model is supported for western Germany by our findings. But what can we say about the theories based on increasing returns and externalities? Here, the answer can not be clear-cut because this theoretical approach comes up with an ambiguous prediction; both the acceptance and rejection of a random walk can be in accordance with this approach. Clearly more research is needed here. It is for instance interesting to observe (recall Figure 3) , that that the evolution of the slope of the rank-size curve indicates that German city sizes have become more equal during the period 1925-1999. If only fundamental geography would matter, this is not easy to explain. The increasing returns approach is perhaps better placed to explain these changes and the possible link with shift in economic structure (de-industralization) in Germany. As has been stressed by Henderson (1974) city sizes differ because of the types of goods produced in certain cities differ. Each city has a size that optimally corresponds to the types of goods produced in that city. City size depends on the strength of external economies with respects to a particular commodity or industry. Changes in the demand for the goods that are currently produced in a city will also change the distribution of urban concentrations. This process might be going on in Germany as the economy evolves from an industrial economy to a service economy. This is very much a topic for future research.
In eastern Germany, city growth follows a random walk. Here our findings in section 4 do seem to lend some support to the random growth approach. At the same time theoretical approaches like the fundamental geography approach or (depending on the precise assumptions) the increasing returns approach look less relevant. In our view eastern Germany is, however, a rather special case and one could doubt whether the period of the GDR could be used to test these 3 theoretical approaches to start with.
All of these theories assume that individual agents, be it workers or firms, are free to choose a location. In a market economy this is a valid assumption, but not in a centrally, planned economy like the GDR. In the West German market economy, well-defined property rights and a well-functioning financial sector made that the rebuilding of houses was relatively easy after 1949. With additional government support this created incentives to rebuild the destructed housing stock. In East Germany this was not the case.
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To some extent property was nationalised, and to another (larger) extent property was still in private hands, however, quite often in the hands of absentee proprietors (who migrated to West Germany). Formally property rights were well defined, but in practice they were not. This implied that the incentives for reconstruction were lacking in East Germany. Furthermore, the state gave priority to rapid industrialisation that used up the scarce investment funds. In addition, the communist party wanted to destroy the remnants of the old Germany, and blew up old castles, stately homes and churches, and left old streets to natural decay. The switch from a market economy to a planned economy implied that economic forces caused by fundamental geography or increasing returns, that were possibly relevant for West German city growth, were no longer or at least less relevant for East German city growth after the creation of the GDR.
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In this respect the finding that the WWII shock had permanent impact on east German city growth may not only or not even in the 1 st place be caused by the war itself but by the 19 Hans-Juergen Wagener pointed out the relevance of these institutional features of the GDR economy. 20 A further illustration of the relevance of the market economy/planned economy distinction for the case of the GDR is the fact that the relative city-size growth in the GDR in more recent (= partly post reunification) times turns out tot depend negatively on the same growth rate during the early days of the GDR in 1946-1964. We ran the following simple regression for our 21 East German cities 'blackboard' planning of the socialist economy that characterized east Germany after WWII.
Conclusions
In this paper we compiled a unique data set on German cities to analyze the impact a large, temporary shock on city-growth and the resulting city-size distribution. Inspired on German city growth. For Germany as a whole we find that this impact is significant but temporary. More importantly, this conclusion also holds for West
German cities but not for the smaller group of East German cities. For the latter we find evidence in favor a random walk, which implies that for these cities WWII and the ensuing establishment of the GDR had a permanent impact on city-growth. Our results for west Germany provide tentative support for those theoretical approaches, most notably the fundamental geography approach, that predict that large, temporary shocks will at most have temporary shocks on city-growth. The results for east
German cities seem to provide support for theories, like the random growth theory, that emphasize that shocks like WW II will permanently change the relative size of cities. It must be kept in mind, however, that the change in East Germany from a market economy to a centrally planned economy renders this conclusion inevitable.
City-size distributions are found to be relative stable over time and the German case is thus no exception. In addition we find that large temporary shocks have temporary effects. These findings do give support to those growth theories that predict mean reversion after a shock. At the same time, it is not true that there is no change at all.
For the German case this is for instance illustrated by the changes in the rank-size distribution in the course of the 20 th century. Germany is changing from an industrial towards a more service-oriented economy. In this respect both the fundamental geography and the random growth approach may be too extreme in its predictions and we may have to call upon the third approach, the increasing returns approach to get a firm grip on the facts. In order to be able to do so, more data are needed and it may in particular be fruitful to look into the changes in the production structure of cities over time.
